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CaseNo.20080128-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

Leroy Worthen,
Defendant/Respondent.

Reply Brief of Petitioner
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT BRANDI'S HATRED
FOR AND ANGER TOWARD HER ADOPTIVE PARENTS IS A
MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL CONDITION FOR PURPOSES OF RULE
506(d)(1), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
In Points I-DI of his Brief of Respondent, defendant repeatedly asserts that
Brandi's hatred for and anger at her adoptive parents is a mental or emotional
condition for purposes of the rule 506(d)(1) exception to the therapist-patient
privilege, and that this alleged mental or emotional condition motivated her to
fabricate the instant charges of aggravated sexual abuse. See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 20,2223, 26, 27, 33-34, 36. Brandi's hatred for and anger at her adoptive parents may
constitute a motive to fabricate, but they are not a mental or emotional condition.
Defendant's contrary assertion fails for two reasons. First, defendant "conceded"
below "that the record does not support a finding that there is a reasonable certainty

that [Brandi] is mentally unstable," and the trial court agreed. R114; see also R i l l
("Defendant has conceded that there is not reasonable certainty concerning the
alleged victim's mental condition") (a copy of the Ruling and Order is attached).
Second, as explained in the State's opening brief, feelings of hatred and anger do not
constitute a mental or emotional condition for purposes of rule 506(d)(1). See Pet.
Br. at 19-32.
A. Defendant conceded below—and the trial court found—that
Brandi does not suffer from a mental or emotional condition.
As set out in the State's opening brief, one of the showing's defendant must
make under rule 506(d)(1) is that the privileged "communication[s]" he seeks are
"relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient."
Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); see also Pet. Br. at 10-32, 42-43. Defendant has not and
cannot make this showing on this record.
The trial court granted in camera review in this case, but not because it found
that Brandi suffered from a mental or emotional condition that effects "her ability to
accurately perceive, remember, or relate events in her life." R114. To the contrary, in
accepting defendant's concession that Brandi was not "mentally unstable," the trial
court expressly found that the record was devoid of evidence that Brandi suffered
from any mental or emotional condition that affected her trustworthiness:

2

There is no information in the record [that] would support such a
findingf,] [that Brandi] suffers from a disorder [that] affects her ability
to accurately perceive, remember, or relate events in her life. There is[,]
further[,] no information that the complainant suffers from a disorder
[that] would affect her ability to be trustworthy. The Court will
therefore deny the request to review in camera her mental health
records to see if there is information [that] may be exculpatory with
respect to these issues.
R114.
Nevertheless, the trial court did grant in camera inspection in this case, based
on its determination that Brandi's records "will contain statements made by the
complainant concerning her feelings, whether positive or negative, toward her
parents/ 7 R112. And the court of appeals affirmed: "The trial court granted
[defendant's motion for the sole purpose of determining whether evidence existed
that would illuminate [her] feelings toward her parents." State v. Worthen, 2008 UT
App23,I7,177P.3d664.
But rule 506 does not recognize any "feelings" exception to therapist-patient
privilege. See Utah R. Evid. 506(d). Moreover, as explained in the State's opening
brief, a patient/victim's mental or emotional condition for purposes of rule
506(d)(1), "means something that requires diagnosis or treatment." Sussman v.
Sussman, 146 P.3d 597,603 (Haw. 2006) (analyzing Hawaii's element of a claim-ordefense exception in child custody case) (quotation marks omitted). It does not

3

mean undiagnosed feelings of any kind, whether they be of anger or hatred, or both.
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelreid, "The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges § 6.13.3,
1001 (2002) (advocating that a "'condition' denotes a longer-lasting physical or
mental state than momentary 'emotion,' 'feeling,' or pain'"); see also Pet. Br. at 19-22.
B. Neither Cardall nor Blake supports defendant's assertion that
Brandi's feelings of anger and hatred constitute a mental or
emotional condition.
Notwithstanding the above, defendant cites State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51,982
P.2d 79 and State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, 63 P.3d 56 in support of his claim that
Brandi's anger and hatred constitute a mental or emotional condition. See Resp. Br.
at 19-28. Defendant's reliance on these cases is misplaced.
Defendant's reliance on Cardall is unavailing for two reasons. First, unlike
this case, there was some indication in the Cardall record that the complainant in
that case suffered from a mental or emotional condition. 1999 UT 51,129. Second,
while Cardall, like defendant, asserted that the complainant was lying, unlike
defendant, Cardall did not assert that the complainant was lying because she hated
or was angry with him. Id.
As set out in the State's opening brief, Cardall asserted that the complainant
in that case lied about the rape allegation against him because she was "a habitual
liar,... mentally and emotionally unstable," and had lied "on at least one previous
4

occasion... about an attempted rape or sexual touching by the school janitor/' Id.;
see also Pet. Br. at 14-15. On appeal, this Court agreed that the complainant's
"mental and emotional state [was] an important element of Cardall's defense." Id. at
131 (citing Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1)); see also Pet. Br. at 14-15. Cardall thus appears to
hold that the complainant's asserted mental instability in that case qualified as a
mental or emotional condition for purposes of rule 506(d)(1), and that it was also an
"important element of Cardall's defense." Id.; see also Pet. Br. at 14-15.
Here, while defendant, like Cardall, initially attempted to show that Brandi
had a mental or emotional condition, he ultimately conceded that Brandi was
mentally stable, and the trial court agreed. R114; see also R i l l . As noted above, the
trial court expressly found that there was no evidence that Brandi suffered "from a
disorder which affects her ability to accurately perceive, remember, or relate events
in her life." R114; see also Pet. Br. at 6,42-43. This alone is grounds upon which to
distinguish the result in Cardall. Unlike this case, there was apparently some
indication in the Cardall record that the complainant was "mentally and emotionally
unstable,"or that she suffered from a relevant mental or emotional condition. 1999
UT 51, f 29 (discussing rule 506(d)(1)). But given defendant's concession below that
Brandi is mentally stable, and the trial court's consequent findings, there is no
similar basis for finding that Brandi suffers from a mental or emotional condition for
5

purposes of rule 506(d)(1). See R114; see also R i l l . Cardall does not, therefore,
support defendant's contention that Brandi suffers from a mental or emotional
condition.
Cardall is further distinguishable on the ground that Cardall did not assert
that the complainant in that case was motivated to lie because she hated or was
angry at him, but rather, only that the complainant had lied because she was a
habitual liar. 1999 UT 51, \ 29. Therefore, although the Court found that the rule
506(d)(1) exception applied in Cardall, it was never asked to decide whether feelings
of hatred or anger may constitute a mental or emotional condition under rule
506(d)(1). Cardall thus offers no support for defendant's assertion that Brandi's
feelings of anger and hatred constitute a mental or emotional condition for purposes
of rule 506(d)(1).
Defendant's reliance on Blake is as misplaced as his reliance on Cardall. Blake
does not support defendant's assertion that feelings of hatred and anger are a
mental or emotional condition under rule 506(d)(1), because Blake did not consider
whether this exception to the therapist-patient privilege applied in that case. As set
out in the State's opening brief, the Court reiterated in Blake that any request for in
camera review of victim mental health records begins with rule 506 and whether the
records fall into one of its exceptions. Blake, 2002 UT 113,1117-18; see also Pet. Br.
6

at 13,17. And if the defendant clears this first hurdle, he must then clear a second
hurdle by showing that there is a reasonable certainty the records contain
exculpatory information. Id. at f f 17-24 (discussing Cardall, 1999 UT 51); see also Pet.
Br. at 13,17. Failure to clear either hurdle defeats a request for in camera review of
privileged records. Id.; see also State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ \ 14-15, 63 P.3d 72
(holding no exception to statutory privilege for rape crisis center counselors applied;
trial court had no authority to compel victim or center to produce records for in
camera review).
But the Court did not determine whether Blake had cleared this first, or
specific exception hurdle by showing that the rule 506(d)(1) exception applied. See
id. at I f 17-18. Rather, the Court expanded on the second, or reasonable certainty
hurdle. See id. at H19-22. Because the Court ultimately determined that Blake had
not cleared this second hurdle, it had no need to revisit the first hurdle, or to directly
address whether Blake had also shown that the sought-for records fell within the
rule 506(d)(1) exception to the therapist-patient privilege. Id. at \ 19 n.2.
Nevertheless, it did so. But the Court did not address the meaning of the
terms "mental[ ] or "emotional condition" as used in rule 506(d)(1). Rather, the
Court looked solely at the meaning of the phrase "element of a claim or defense."
Blake, 2002 UT 113, f 19 n.2. And, taking a step away from the apparent holding in
7

Cardall, that impeachment evidence is an element of a claim or defense, see 1999 UT
51, f 31, the Court observed in dicta that "[i]t [was] unlikely that impeachment
evidence qualifies as an element of a claim or defense." Blake, 2002 UT 113, f ! 19
n.2; see also State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, \ \ 42-43,125 P.3d 878 (same). Thus, Blake
and Gonzales limit Cardall insofar as that case held that impeachment evidence is an
element of a claim or defense. But Blake says nothing about whether feelings of
anger or hatred constitute a mental or emotional condition. Therefore, Blake, like
Cardall, offers no support for defendant's assertion that Brandi's feelings of anger
and hatred in this case constitute a mental or emotional condition.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT MOTIVE OR
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE IS AN ELEMENT OF A DEFENSE FOR
PURPOSES OF RULE 506(d)(1), OF THE UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE
Notwithstanding the above, in Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that
because Brandi's feelings of hatred and anger, or motive to fabricate, is exculpatory
evidence, it is necessarily an element of his defense for purposes of rule 506(d)(1).
See Resp. Br. at 32 ("If this case is viewed upon with the defense establishing that we
know why [Brandi] is lying then certainly that basis for her lying becomes an
element or a claim of this defense"). In support, defendant again cites Cardall and
Blake, and additionally cites Codianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 874 (Utah 1979). Id. at 30-
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32. But just as Cardall and Blake do not support defendant's assertions that feelings
of hatred and anger constitute a mental or emotional condition, they do not support
his assertion that Brandi's feelings of anger and hatred are an element of his defense.
Nor does Codianna.
First, as shown above, defendant's reliance on Cardall is unavailing because
that case must now be viewed through the lens of Blake and Gonzales. The court of
appeals read Cardall to suggest that the impeachment evidence sought in that case
was an element of Cardall's defense and that it thus sufficed to pierce the rule 506(b)
privilege. However, this Court in Blake and Gonzales, read Cardall much more
narrowly. For the reasons set forth in the State's opening brief, the Court should
continue in the direction of Blake and Gonzales and clarify once and for all that mere
impeachment evidence is not an element of a defense for purposes of rule 506(d)(1).
See Pet. Br. at 19-48.
Second, defendant's reliance on Blake borders on the frivolous. Defendant
asserts that Blake supports his argument that impeachment evidence qualifies as an
element of his "'we know why she's lying'" defense.

See Resp. Br. at 32

(capitalization and bolding omitted); see also id. at 33. But the Court stated in Blake
that "[i]t is unlikely that impeachment evidence qualifies as an element of a claim or
defense." Blake, 2002 UT 113,f19 n.2. Defendant's error again stems from his
9

failure to understand that privileged records—like those protected by rule 506—are
protected by two high hurdles in Utah.
As explained, a defendant seeking privileged records must show both that
they fall within an exception to the privilege, and that there is a reasonable certainty
that the records contain exculpatory information. See Pet. Br. at 13; see also Blake,
2002 UT 113,H17-24 (discussing Cardall, 1999 UT 51). Failure to clear either hurdle
defeats a request for in camera review of privileged records. Id.; see also Gomez, 2002
UT 120,111445.
Here, defendant quotes the Court's discussion in Blake of the kinds of specific
facts that must be alleged to establish the second, or reasonable certainty hurdle:
"At a minimum, specific facts must be alleged. These might include
references to records of only certain counseling sessions, which are
alleged to be relevant, independent allegations made by others that a
victim has recanted, or extrinsic evidence of some disorder that might
lead to uncertainty regarding a victim's trustworthiness. This listing is
not intended to be exclusive, but is only an example of the type and
quality of proof needed to overcome the high Cardall hurdle/'
Resp. Br. at 32 (quoting Blake, 2002 UT 113,122). Defendant posits that because the
above examples are also examples of impeachment evidence, they are necessarily
elements of a claim or defense under rule 506(d)(1). Resp. Br. at 33 ("Are these not
examples given us by this Court in Blake, that create exculpatory evidence
supporting an element of a claim or defense and also have the ability to impeach the
10

witness?"). But defendant's assertion begs the question. The fact that Blake
identifies examples of impeachment evidence that may suffice to establish the
second, or reasonable certainty hurdle, does not answer the question of whether
impeachment evidence suffices to establish the first, or specific exception hurdle.
For the reasons set forth supra at pages 1-8 of this reply brief, and in the State's
opening brief at pages 13-32, it does not.
Finally, defendant's reliance on Codianna is similarly unavailing. Codianna is a
discovery case, not a privilege or exception-to-privilege case. Codianna thus
involves a discussion of materiality, i.e., whether the non-disclosed motive evidence
in the case had a reasonable probability of effecting a different outcome. 594 P.2d at
875-76; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (defining material
evidence as evidence having a reasonable probability of effecting a different
outcome); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,681-82 (1985) (same). But Codianna
says nothing about whether motive or impeachment evidence is an element of a
claim or defense for purposes of piercing any privilege, including rule 506(d)(1). For
example, Codianna filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the
prosecution withheld non-privileged evidence that one of his codefendants had a
motive to kill the victim. Codianna, 594 P.2d at 875. Codianna claimed that this
evidence supported his defense theory, was contrary to the State's theory, and also
11

"generally and specifically exculpatory to [Codianna]." Id. This Court remanded the
case to the district court for a plenary hearing on "whether there [had] been any
withholding of material evidence from which there is any reasonable likelihood that
there may have been a different result, either as to the verdict rendered, or upon the
sentence imposed," but expressed no view as to the correctness of Codianna's
claims, or the "materiality" of the alleged motive evidence. Id. at 876-77 (citing
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)).
Codianna, therefore, does not support defendant's assertion that motive or
impeachment evidence is an element of a claim or defense for any purpose, let alone
for purposes of the rule 506(d)(1) exception to the therapist-patient privilege at issue
here.
Rather, Codianna stands for no more than the unremarkable proposition that
non-privileged motive or impeachment evidence may be material, or potentially
exculpatory, such that it must be turned over to the defense. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at
678 (holding suppression of impeachment evidence required new trial, "only if the
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial"). Codianna does not support the sweeping generalization that
all impeachment evidence relates to the emotional condition of the victim and is also
an element of a claim or defense for purposes of rule 506(d)(1). As explained, a
12

victim's motive to fabricate is not a mental or emotional condition; nor is it an
element of any claim or defense. See Pet. Br. at 20-29 (analyzing rule 506(d)(1)).
Defendant consequently fails to show that the rule 506(d)(1) exception to the
therapist-patient privilege applies here. See Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, i f 42-43; Blake,
2002 UT 113,119 n.2.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT THE SECOND-HAND
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE HE SEEKS IN BRANDTS PRIVILEGED
THERAPY RECORDS IS NOT CUMULATIVE TO THAT WHICH HE
ALREADY POSSESSES IN HER PERSONAL DIARY
The State does not dispute that defendant has shown a reasonable certainty
that Brandi's therapy records contain exculpatory evidence, or additional statements
of Brandi's feelings of hatred and anger toward her adoptive parents. See Pet. Br. at
33; see also Worthen, 2008 UT App 23, f 24. But this showing is inadequate for
intrusion into her mental health records, even in camera. As set out in the State's
opening brief, defendant is not entitled to in camera review. The only impeachment
evidence he has identified to a reasonable certainty is cumulative and relevant only
to the undisputed point that Brandi hates both of her adoptive parents; it is thus
constitutionally immaterial. See Blake, 2002 UT 113, % 23 (holding "evidence is
deemed material where there is a reasonable probability that, if the evidence is
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disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding will be different" (citing
Cardall, 1999 UT 51,130)); see also Pet. Br. at 33-37.
Defendant concedes that he seeks only additional evidence of Brandi's
feelings of hatred and anger toward her parents. See Resp. Br. at 36. Nevertheless,
he asserts that Brandi's privileged therapy records are not cumulative. Resp. Br. at
37 ("Clearly[,] obtaining more information about the potential hatred of [Brandi]
toward her mother between journal entries is not cumulative7'). But defendant's
characterization of the impeachment evidence he seeks as non-cumulative does not
make it so.
To establish that this evidence is non-cumulative, defendant must show that
the additional motive evidence he seeks is "different from that available elsewhere,"
and thus "independently probative." State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719,724 (Wis. App.
1993); see also Pet. Br. at 34-37 (discussing Shiffra and People v. Stanaway, 521 N.S.2d
557(Mich. 1994)). As explained in the State's opening brief, the psychological records
sought in Shiffra, though cumulative of impeachment evidence in Shiffra's
possession, were also deemed to be independently probative because they may have
confirmed the victim's mental health problems. See Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d at 723-724.
In Stanaway, the psychological records actually contained the best evidence of the
child-victim's motive to fabricate, in the form of a hand-written note "to her
14

mother's live-in boyfriend," the contents of which was disputed by the parties. See
Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d at 576-577 n.44. Thus, the psychological records at issue in
Shijfra were viewed as a psychiatric backstop to the lay opinion evidence Shiffra
already possessed and therefore had "independently probative" value. 499 N.W.2d
at at 724. And in Stanaway, the child-victim's records were deemed non-cumulative
because the parties disputed the contents of her hand-written note, the only copy of
which was apparently contained in the therapy records. 521 N.W.2d at 577 n.44.
Defendant has not and cannot make similar showings on this record. See Pet.
Br. at 33-48. Defendant cannot show that Brandi's therapy records are necessary to
confirm a mental or emotional condition because he has already conceded that
Brandi is mentally stable. See R114, R i l l ; see also Pet. Br. at 42-43. And defendant
cannot show that Brandi's therapy records are necessary to establish her motive to
fabricate because the State concedes that Brandi has a motive. See Pet. Br. at 33.
Indeed, defendant already possesses Brandi's first-hand account of the anger and
hatred she feels toward her parents as recorded in her personal journal. See Pet. Br.
at 42-43.

Given these circumstances, Brandi's therapy records lack any

independently probative value.
Here, instead of attempting to show that Brandi's privileged records contain
independently probative evidence, defendant broadly asserts that the "'prosecutor
15

must disclose to the defense psychological evidence' about the 'government
witness whenever that evidence can substantially affect defense counsel's ability to
impeach the witness/" Resp. Br, at 35 (quoting State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, % 32,979
P.2d 799 (bolding in original)). Defendant's reliance on Bakalov is misplaced.
Bakalov is a discovery case and did not involve any claim of privilege. The
only psychological evidence at issue in Bakalov was turned over to the State by the
rape victim and her private therapist, no claim of privilege was asserted. Id. at f f
33-38. The State does not dispute that exculpatory psychological evidence in its
possession must be turned over to the defense. See Pet. Br. at 30-31; see also State's
discussion of Codianna, supra. Because the State does not possess Brandi's privileged
therapy records, Bakalov does not assist defendant's quest to obtain them.

16

CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the court of appeals' opinion and remand to the
trial court with instructions to withdraw the order granting in camera review of
Brandi's privileged counseling records..
Respectfully submitted 29 October 2008.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

mt
DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner
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Addendum

Addendum

FILED
, DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

AUG 0 2 2935
JOAHHEMicKEE CLERK

VW

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
LEROY WORTHEN,

CASE NO. 051800543
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on "'Defendant's Subpoena
for Medical and Therapy Records," filed on May 03, 2006. The
State's opposition was filed May 10, 2006. The Defendant's reply was filed June 30, 2006. The Court notes that the time
frame for arguing this issue has not been observed by the Defendant's counsel. The Defendant's reply should have been received
by the Court no later than June 16, 2006, at the latest. Defense counsel is instructed to observe the time limits imposed
by the Court in the future.
The Defendant is seeking to subpoena certain medical and
therapy records of the alleged victim of the sexual abuse
charged against the Defendant. Generally speaking, such records
are privileged. Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 506(b). However,
the rule is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is Utah
Rule of Evidence Rule 506(d)(1). In construing this exception,
the Supreme Court of Utah has held that "there are situations in
which otherwise privileged communications between a crime victim
and her therapist might be subject to in camera review and disclosure." State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, f 19 (citing State v.
Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 51 29-35) . The Court then outlined the
standard whereby a court is to determine whether the exception
applies. A defendant "must show, with reasonable certainty,

DEPUTY

that the sought-after records actually contain exculpatory evidence which would be favorable to his defense." Blake, 2002 UT
113, 5 19 (internal quotations and punctuation omitted). The
Court then attempts to quantify "reasonable certainty" as "on
the more stringent side of more likely than not." Jd. at 1 20
(internal quotation omitted). With the legal standard identified, the Court now turns to the Defendant's request.
I. MENTAL INSTABILITY
At the hearing in this matter held May 03, 2006, the Defendant conceded that the record does not support a finding that
there is reasonable certainty that the alleged victim is mentally unstable. The Court agrees. There is no information in
the record which would support such a finding with respect to
allegations that the complainant suffers from a disorder which
affects her ability to accurately perceive, remember, or relate
events in her life. There is further no information that the
complainant suffers from a disorder which would affect her ability to be trustworthy. The Court will therefore deny the request to review in camera her mental health records to see if
there is information which may be exculpatory with respect to
these issues.
II. DENIAL OF ABUSE
The Defendant has also requested a review of the records to
determine whether the complainant ever denied sexual and / or
physical abuse during her interaction with therapist or other
medical professionals. To support the request for the records
of Dr. Jones, and physician at Ashley Valley Medical Center, and
Brenda Bowman, a counselor with the Northeastern Counseling Center, the Defendant indicates that "It is believed by the alleged
victim's mother that Brenda Bowman specifically asked the victim
if she was being sexually abused by anyone . . . ." A mere belief is not sufficient to support the request. Further, it appears to the Court that the Defendant's request for such information is based upon the fact that the complainant's mother was
present while the health care professionals questioned the complainant. If this is the case, such statements are themselves
privileged and cannot be divulged, as the patient has the right

to prevent anyone present during the interview from disclosing
any information obtained at that time.
Similarly, the Defendant argues that the complainant never
claims to have been abused by the Defendant while being treated
at the University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute (U.N.I.)•
Again, there is no basis given for the statement which would
support a finding of "reasonable certainty."
With respect to the issue of whether the records of Carolyn
Henry should be reviewed, any statement made to Ms* Henry by the
complainant while in the presence of her mother is again privileged. The Court disagrees with the Defendant's conclusion that
the presence of a mother of a minor child is outside the privilege afforded by Rule 506. The rule specifically includes ". .
. guardians or members of the patient's family who are present
to further the interest of the patient becaus,e they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communications, or
participation in the diagnosis and treatment . . . ." Utah R.
Evid. 506(b)(3).
Finally, with respect to the request to review the records
of Northeastern Counseling Center, the Defendant relies upon
statements made by the complainant to Karen Douthit in therapy
sessions. Again, these are privileged for the same reasons
given above. Further, the Defendant merely states that "it was
learned [from Kirk Harris] that the alleged victim in a therapy
session with Karen Douthit . . . made new allegations of abuse .
. . ." This is a mere conclusion of what Mr. Harris may have
said.
Based upon review of the record before the Court, there is
no information upon which the Court can make a finding that
^reasonable certainty" exists that the complainant denies being
sexually abused. This is based upon the Court's ruling that any
statements made during therapy or to a treating physician are
privileged and incapable of supporting a finding of reasonable
certainty. Without such reasonable certainty, the Court cannot
grant the Defendant's request. Therefore, the Court will deny
the request as it relates to denials of abuse.

III. RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERIZATION
The Defendant also requests any statement concerning the
complainants relationship with her parents. The Defendant alleges that the complainant was sexually abused in the home of
her natural parents and was removed from that home after she reported the sexual abuse. The defense theory here is that the
complainant was motivated to lie about abuse by the Defendant in
order to be removed from her adoptive home. Without going to
great lengths to analyze the issue, the Court will agree with
the Defendant that where the Defendant has provided information
which shows that there is "reasonable certainty'7 that the mental
health records would contain exculpatory evidence concerning motive, an in camera review of the records would be appropriate.
To support the finding of reasonably certainty, the Defendant relies upon thirteen diary entries. These entries express
the complainant's frustration with, and hatred toward, her parents. The entries also include a threat to kill her parents if
they continue to treat the complainant in a particular manner in
the future. Some of the entries were written contemporaneously
with the requested counseling records and do provide the Court
with "reasonable certainty" that the requested records will contain statements made by the complainant concerning her feelings,
whether positive or negative, toward her parents.
Based upon the record, the Court will order an in camera
review of all the records requested by the Defendant to discover
any statements concerning the complainant's feelings toward her
parents. This review is not intended to reveal her statements
concerning the conduct of her parents, unless the complainant
specifically relied upon the conduct as a justification for her
feelings (i.e., "I hate my mom / dad because she / he . . . . ,"
u
My dad / mom did
and I love him / her for it," etc.).
The focus of the review will be on assessing the complainant's
feelings regarding her parents.
The problem here is that in this case the Court has authorized a review of the records for a fairly limited purpose and
has specifically found that there is no justification for a review for other purposes. Therefore, the Court does not propose

that the entire record be reviewed by the judge. The Court will
only review those statements regarding the complainant's feelings toward her parents. To limit the amount of information
presented to the judge, the Court will direct the law clerk to
review the record and highlight all relevant statements. The
Court will then review only the highlighted statements. This
process will facilitate a limited review of the records for the
specific purpose identified above.
To review, the Defendant has conceded that there is not
reasonable certainty concerning the alleged victim's mental condition. He is therefore not entitled to have the Court review
the records in their entirety for that purpose. The Court has
also found that there is no basis for a review concerning any
denials of abuse. Therefore, the Defendant's request as it concerns that issue will also be denied. The Court does find "reasonable certainty" that the requested records will contain information regarding the complainant's feelings toward her parents. Therefore, the Court will grant the Defendant's request
for the records, but will not disclose any of the contents of
the records until the Court has had a chance to review them in
camera.
As stated above, to restrict the review to its proper
purpose, the Court will rely upon the law clerk to highlight
only the relevant portions of the record. This should not be a
difficult task for the law clerk. It further has the advantage
of limiting the review to the specific evidence which justified
the review. Any objections to this process must be filed with
the Court within ten (10) days.
ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the Defendant's request is GRANTED IN PART, as outlined in
the ruling.
Dated this

/

day of

m^^oJ^

, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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